University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2014

Tesla and the Car Dealers' Lobby
Daniel A. Crane
University of Michigan Law School, dancrane@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1320

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Commercial Law Commons, Consumer
Protection Law Commons, and the Transportation Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Crane, Daniel A. "Tesla and the Car Dealers' Lobby." Regulation 37, no. 2 (2014): 10-4.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

10 / Regulation / summer 2014
COMMERCE & TRADE

Tesla and the
Car Dealers’ Lobby
Will an innovative, new carmaker bring about a long-overdue
change to the automobile industry?

T

✒ By Daniel A. Crane

esla Motors, the offspring of entrepreneur
Elon Musk (who brought us Pay-Pal and
SpaceX), is the most exciting automotive development in many decades and a
marquee story of American technological
dynamism and innovation. The company’s
luxury electric cars have caused a sensation
in the auto industry, including a review by Consumer Reports calling Tesla’s Model S the best car it ever tested.
Despite the acclaim, Tesla faces enormous challenges in penetrating an automotive market that has been dominated for a
century by internal combustion engines. Not only must it build
cars that customers want to drive (and ultimately produce them
cost-effectively), but it must build the battery-swapping and
charging infrastructure that makes charging as easy and reliable
as pumping gas. Those are tall orders.
But Tesla’s research and development, technological, and infrastructure challenges seem to be dwarfed these days by political
challenges mounted by the powerful car dealers’ lobby. Tesla has
chosen a direct-to-consumer distribution model, one that bypasses
traditional franchised dealer networks. The carmaker is operating
its own showrooms and interacting with consumers directly over
the Internet. Not surprisingly, that model has struck a deeply negative chord with car dealers who prefer not to be cut out of the action.
The dealers have responded by invoking decades-old laws aimed at
curbing direct distribution by car manufacturers, and seeking new
legislative or regulatory decisions aimed at closing any loopholes
that might allow Tesla to distribute directly. Thus far, the dealers
have succeeded in blocking Tesla in states like Texas, South Carolina, and New Jersey, and are continuing to mount their campaign
on a state-by-state level as the company tries to grow its footprint.

Daniel A. Cr ane is Associate Dean for Faculty and Research and the Frederick

Paul Furth Sr. Professor of Law at the University of Michigan.

The dealers have been successful largely because of their political clout in local elections, where they make significant campaign
contributions. They have attempted to justify the direct distribution bans as a form of consumer protection and public safety
regulation. Slowly, consumers are waking up to the fact that the
dealers’ arguments are completely unfounded. Consumer protection and public safety have nothing to do with those restrictions;
they are protectionism for car dealers, pure and simple.

Origins of Automotive
Distribution Restrictions

State laws restricting direct distribution of automobiles are not a
new phenomenon. They grew out of intensive lobbying efforts by
car dealers in the 1930s–1950s, in response to perceived abuses
of the franchise relationship by car manufacturers. At that time,
the car companies were large, powerful, and few in number.
Manufacturers would secure contracts that imposed draconian
terms on the dealers. According to a 1956 U.S. Senate committee report, franchise agreements of the 1950s typically did not
require the manufacturer to supply the dealer with any inventory
and allowed the manufacturer to terminate the dealer at will
without any showing of cause. Conversely, the manufacturers
could often force dealerships to accept cars whether the dealers
could sell them or not. Thus, the franchise agreements were perceived as shifting risk downward to dealers and reward upward
to the manufacturer. Ford and General Motors, in particular,
were accused of using their superior economic leverage to play
extreme hardball with the dealers.
The dealers made some headway in the courts challenging
the franchise agreements as contracts of adhesion—that is, contracts in which one side has all the bargaining power and uses
that power to its advantage. But the relief the dealers ultimately
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needed was legislative. During the 1930s–1950s, the dealers
pressured Congress to enact a statutory scheme protecting the
dealers, but they got relatively little of what they wanted. A
1940 study by the Federal Trade Commission, which had been
encouraged by the car dealers, did find some franchising abuses
by manufacturers, but the report’s headline was that the use
of manufacturer power to squeeze the dealers actually created
intense retail competition, to the benefit of consumers. The FTC
also turned the tables on the dealers and accused them of various
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anticompetitive or anticonsumer practices, such as “padding”
new car prices, price fixing, and “packing” finance charges (i.e.,
charging fees without the buyer’s knowledge)—not the news the
dealers wanted.
Eventually, the dealers secured a modest federal victory with
the Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act of 1956, which allows
dealers to bring a federal suit against a manufacturer who, without
good faith, fails to comply with the terms of a franchise agreement
or terminates, cancels, or refuses to renew a franchise.
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The dealers secured more significant victory in state legislatures. During the 1940s–1950s, states began to pass statutes
governing automotive franchise relations. Today, such laws are on
the books in all 50 states. Their terms vary, but they commonly
include prohibitions on forcing dealers to accept unwanted cars,
protections against termination of franchise agreements, and
restrictions on granting additional franchises in a franchised
dealer’s relevant market area.
The statutory provisions that trouble Tesla prohibit a manufacturer from distributing its cars directly to consumers, effectively requiring the manufacturer to deal exclusively through
dealers. The legislative concern reflected in those statutes is that
if a manufacturer integrated forward into distribution, it might
compete unfairly with its own franchised dealers by undercutting them on price. As discussed below, if that concern was ever
legitimate, it seems much less so in the current world of vigorous
competition among a large number of manufacturers. But the
key point is that the concern should not apply to Tesla or any
other car manufacturer that wants to avoid franchising altogether. At most, if one were worried about “undercutting” by the

ple of significant consumer savings from direct distribution in
Brazil, where such distribution is legal:
Since 2000, customers in Brazil can order the Celta over the
internet from a site that links them with GM’s assembly plant
and 470 dealers nationwide. By 2006, 700,000 Celtas had been
produced and the car continues to be one of Brazil’s best sellers. Consumers have 20 “build-combinations” from which to
configure a model of their choice, including colors and accessories, and can view each change as it is being made. GM built five
distribution centers throughout Brazil to reduce transportation
time from its assembly plant and buyers can track location of
their car online on its way to delivery at a dealer of their choice.
The time from configuration at the factory to delivery is only
about a week, in contrast to the several week wait that can be
common in ordering a car in the United States.

Predictably, U.S. dealers were no more sympathetic to Internet
distribution than they were to manufacturers setting up their
own showrooms. They put pressure on state motor vehicle commissions to shut down Internet sales. In 1999, the Texas Motor
Vehicle Division shut down efforts by Ford
to sell preowned vehicles over the Internet.
The Texas statute made it illegal for anyone
to serve as an automobile dealer in the state
without a license and then made it illegal
for manufacturers to obtain a license. In
2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit upheld that restriction against constitutional challenge.
The manufacturers’ frustrated efforts
to deal directly kept a relatively low profile until Tesla burst onto the scene several
years ago. The combination of Tesla’s revolutionary new technology, the flamboyance of Musk, and his decision to bypass dealers
altogether thrust the issue into the national spotlight.

If legislators were truly worried about carmakers
undercutting franchisees, then the law would prohibit
carmakers from having both direct retailing and
franchising, instead of just prohibiting direct retail sales.

manufacturer, the rule should be a prohibition on manufacturer
retail operations for manufacturers that also franchise, not for
those that bypass franchising altogether. Nonetheless, the dealers have thus far enjoyed success in utilizing the prohibitions to
block direct distribution that bypasses dealers.

Along Comes the Internet

With the advent of the Internet, manufacturers began to see the
opportunities to deal more efficiently with consumers by allowing buyers to place direct Internet orders for new cars. A 2009
research paper by a Justice Department economist, citing a 2000
Goldman Sachs report, estimated that the cost savings to consumers from direct distribution could be as great as $2,225 per
vehicle, or 8.6 percent of the vehicle cost. The report explained
that “[t]he components of those savings were as follows: $832
from improvement in matching supply with consumer demand;
$575 from lower inventory; $387 from fewer dealerships; $381
from lower sales commissions and $50 from lower overall shipping costs.” The Justice Report also pointed to a real-world exam-

Foundational Economics of Distribution

Before getting into the dealers’ arguments in favor of direct distribution bans, let us recall a few preliminaries on the economics of distribution. Distribution is merely one of the functions
that a firm can decide to perform internally or else purchase
on the market. As Ronald Coase observed in his 1937 article
“The Nature of The Firm,” whether a company performs such
services internally or buys them on the market is a question of
the agency and transactions costs of those respective forms of
distribution.
There are many reasons why manufacturers might prefer to
distribute through independent dealers. It shifts the investment
in distribution to someone other than the manufacturer, allowing the manufacturer to focus on its core competence in research
and development and manufacturing. It shifts distribution deci-
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sions to managers with local market knowledge. It may create
economies of scale or scope as dealers sell several different brands
under a single roof.
But there are also good reasons why a manufacturer might
prefer to sell directly to consumers. The manufacturer may be
concerned that the dealers will focus more on short-term sales
maximization than long-term investment in building the brand.
That could be particularly worrisome for a company like Tesla
that is introducing a disruptive new technology that still needs to
be proven in the market. Sales of the new brand may cannibalize
dealer revenues earned from selling other brands, lowering their
incentive to invest in promoting the new brand. Manufacturers
may also fret that local dealers will be unsophisticated about new
technologies and that training and monitoring will be easier if
retail distribution stays in house.
There is no a priori reason to favor one model or the other.
Some companies choose to distribute their goods only through
independent dealers. Others, like Apple, follow a dual distribution
path, distributing their products through both their own outlets
and independent retailers. Finally, some firms prefer to do all of
their own distribution. Competition in the market should inform
firms whether they have chosen the optimal strategy or should
rethink their distribution decision. But there is no reason for
legislators or regulators to favor one method or the other.

Dealer Arguments in Favor
of Restricted Distribution

Since Tesla has shone an unflattering spotlight onto the dealers’ favored regulations, the dealers have been busy explaining
themselves. Alas, their arguments are so problematic that they
only serve to bolster the view that the restrictions are pure protectionism.
The dealers’ leading argument is that banning direct distribution is a form of “consumer protection.” They argue that
creating “competition” in retail distribution of cars is necessary to prevent manufacturers from price-gouging customers.
But the idea that a vertically integrated manufacturer has a
“monopoly” over the brand’s retail distribution that needs to
be broken up by outsourcing the retail function to independent dealers is farcical. As economists have long understood,
if a manufacturer has market power, it will extract the full
monopoly profit regardless of whether it sells to dealers or
end users. It will be fully embedded in either the wholesale
or retail price. Since retail distribution is just a cost of doing
business, Tesla will increase its monopoly profits by minimizing the cost of retail distribution because then it will sell more
cars. If anything, outsourcing the retail distribution function
to locally dominant automobile dealers could lead to double
marginalization and increased prices. Hence, as the Supreme
Court has repeatedly noted in the vertical restraints context,
the interests of consumers and manufacturers are aligned in
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disfavoring dealer market power. Neither Tesla nor any other
manufacturer can increase its profits by adding a monopoly
markup to the retail price. Thus, if retail price competition is
the concern, we should be far more concerned about the incentives of dealers than manufacturers.
The dealers also argue that having local dealers is necessary to
ensure that customers are adequately served. For example, Bob
Glaser of the North Carolina Automobile Dealers’ Association
has asserted that the restrictions are a form of “consumer protection” because “a dealer who has invested a significant amount
of capital in a community is more committed to taking care of
that area’s customers.” The obvious rejoinder is that Tesla and
other manufacturers have as much interest as the dealers—if not
more—in seeing that customers get the level of service that they
are willing to pay for. If Tesla gets a bad reputation for quality, it
will fail and never recoup the billions of dollars it is investing in
creating new technologies. Car manufacturers make considerably
larger brand-specific fixed capital investments than do dealers, and
hence have greater incentives to protect the long-term integrity
of the brand.
The dealers also argue that the restrictions are necessary for
public safety. The dealers have pounced on recent news that GM
failed to recall certain vehicles with safety problems, leading to
tragic losses of life. But it is hard to understand how that episode
supports the arguments against direct distribution; those failures
to issue safety recalls occurred while GM was distributing through
traditional dealer networks. The dealers argue that product recalls
are a cost to manufacturers, whereas they are an opportunity to
dealers to earn income. But that argument is false. Dealers do not
make the decision to issue safety recalls. Those decisions come
from the manufacturer and the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration. Once a safety recall has been issued, either a dealer
or the manufacturer can service it.
Tellingly, I am unaware of any consumer group supporting
the dealers’ consumer protection arguments. That leaves one last
major category of argument for the dealers: independent dealers
are civic bastions of local communities and therefore deserve
to be specially protected. Whether that is true—and whether
the dealers make better philanthropic citizens than would any
other economic special interest granted a protected position—is
entirely speculative. But if the model of direct distribution is
so superior to franchised distribution that eliminating legal
protections would put the dealers out of business, then there
must be something systematically inefficient about franchised
distribution. In that case, both consumers and local communities would be better served if state legislatures just levied a tax
on auto sales and distributed the money pro rata to local civic
organizations.

Selective Exemptions and Crony Capitalism

Since direct distribution bans seem impossible to justify on any
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rational economic grounds, both the dealers and some other
manufacturers have turned the argument into one against
favoritism for Tesla. For example, as Ohio was recently considering legislation that would create a special direct-dealing
exemption for Tesla, GM wrote a public letter to Ohio Gov.
John Kasich (R) complaining about the proposed legislation.
What was most telling about GM’s letter was its straightforward
admission that allowing Tesla to engage in direct distribution
would give the carmaker a “distinct competitive advantage”
and would create a “significant disparate impact” on competition in the
auto industry. That is tantamount to
a confession that direct distribution is
more efficient. If Tesla will gain a competitive advantage by bypassing dealers,
shouldn’t we want all car companies to
have that same advantage?
GM is quite right in complaining that
permission to engage in direct distribution should not become a special privilege
that is handed out through backroom
deals. That would just further the anticompetitive and anticonsumer distortions created by the sort of crony capitalism the
dealers have already succeeded in implementing. Rather, direct
distribution should be an option available to all manufacturers.
That brings the argument back full circle to the original
purpose of the state direct distribution prohibitions: preventing
manufacturers from competing with their own franchised dealers. Apart from the frivolous consumer protection arguments,
should there still be a concern that manufacturers will take
unfair advantage of their dealers by undercutting them on price
at retail? Even if that argument had some validity at a time when
the Big Three Detroit manufacturers controlled the entire U.S.
market, it has none today. There are now seven large manufacturers selling over 100,000 units a month in the U.S. market and
many smaller manufacturers with significant sales. Dealers have
a choice of manufacturers for whom to distribute and therefore
significantly greater clout in franchise negotiations. Many dealerships are no longer small mom-and-pop organizations but large
multi-location and even multi-state ventures. The dealers should
protect their interests through contractual negotiations rather
than through protectionist legislation.

to consumer welfare and completely unrelated to their ostensible justifications.
There are signs, however, the dealers’ grip may be slipping.
Tesla sees direct distribution as critical to the success of its business model and appears to be settling in for a long ground war.
In the meantime, voices from across the political spectrum have
pointed out the absurdities of the direct distribution bans. In
March, I spearheaded an open letter about New Jersey’s ban to
Gov. Chris Christie (R). The 72 distinguished economists and law

The Politics of Getting It Right

Readings

General Motors admitted that allowing Tesla to engage
in direct distribution would give the carmaker a “distinct
competitive advantage” and would create a “significant
disparate impact” on competition in the auto industry.

Public choice theory teaches that small groups of people with
a large economic interest in protectionist legislation will often
be successful at implementing such regulations if the costs
are spread over a broad group of consumers, none of whom
has a sufficient individual interest in seeking to overturn the
legislation. Such theories explain the persistence of the direct
distribution bans in the face of evidence that they are harmful

professors who signed the letter come from across the political
spectrum and make an unusual coalition, but they are unified in
explaining these laws as anticonsumer protectionism. Since the
Tesla story gained momentum in national news media, several
of the leading contenders for the 2016 Republican presidential
nomination as well as prominent politicians from both parties
have publicly announced support for allowing direct distribution.
The dealers surely will not give up easily, but the opposition is
strengthening.
Direct distribution of cars has emerged as a national political
issue because of the environmental and technological salience of
electric cars and tremendous appeal of the Tesla brand. Similar
stories occasionally emerge when a sympathetic or quirky set of
facts makes a compelling story, as when a group of Louisiana
monks successfully sued for the right to make and distribute
caskets against the self-interested wishes of the Louisiana State
Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors. Regrettably, many
industries remain bound by protectionist rules designed to insulate the industry incumbents from competition. Car manufacturers should have the right to choose the most efficient means of
distribution, and so should everyone else.
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